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Yijin Zhang, Jun Li, and Jiangzhou Wang
Abstract—In this paper, given the beamforming vector of
confidential messages and artificial noise (AN) projection matrix
and total power constraint, a power allocation (PA) strategy
of maximizing secrecy rate (Max-SR) is proposed for secure
directional modulation (DM) networks. By the method of La-
grange multiplier, the analytic expression of the proposed PA
strategy is derived. To confirm the benefit from the Max-SR-
based PA strategy, we take the null-space projection (NSP)
beamforming scheme as an example and derive its closed-form
expression of optimal PA strategy. From simulation results, we
find the following facts: in the medium and high signal-to-noise-
ratio (SNR) regions, compared with three typical PA parameters
such β = 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, the optimal PA shows a substantial
SR performance gain with maximum gain percent up to more
than 60%. Additionally, as the PA factor increases from 0 to 1,
the achievable SR increases accordingly in the low SNR region
whereas it first increases and then decreases in the medium and
high SNR regions, where the SR can be approximately viewed
as a convex function of the PA factor. Finally, as the number
of antennas increases, the optimal PA factor becomes large and
tends to one in the medium and high SNR region. In other words,
the contribution of AN to SR can be trivial in such a situation.
Index Terms—power allocation, secure, directional modulation,
secrecy rate, beamforming
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmission, secu-
rity and privacy of confidential information increasingly be-
comes an extremely important problem in wireless networks.
Directional modulation (DM), as a emerging and promis-
ing technique of physical layer security (PLS) in wireless
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networks, has attracted tremendous research interests from
both academia and industry world. The concept of secrecy
capacity was proposed for a discrete memoryless wiretap
channel in [1], where the secure communication may be
safeguarded if the channel of legitimated user is better than
the channel of eavesdropper. Furthermore, artificial noise (AN)
was utilized in [2]–[6] to enhance the information-theoretic
security. In two typical scenarios, the transmitter with multiple
antennas and the multiple-relay cooperation were used to
improve the secret communication in [2]. In [5], the authors
proposed an AN-aided zero forcing synthesis approach for
secure multi-beam DM, and the dynamic multi-beam DM was
achieved by randomly changing the AN vector at the symbol
rate. As such, the intended users could receive confidential
information while illegitimated users could not successfully
recover the confidential messages. Moreover, some symbol-
level precoding and cooperative relays were employed in [7]
and [8]–[10] to enhance the PLS of wireless networks. Robust
synthesis schemes for secure DM were proposed in [11]–
[14] to enhance the security performance of desired directions
and distort the constellation points of undesired directions.
Given the uniform distribution of direction of arrival (DOA)
measurement errors, the authors can significantly improved the
bit error rate (BER) performance based on minimum mean
square error criteria in [11]. In addition, the authors of [12]–
[14] extended the idea of literature [11] to multi-beam DM sce-
narios in broadcasting systems, multicast precoding and multi-
user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems in the
presence of direction angel estimation errors. Furthermore, the
authors in [15] proposed a low-complexity secure and precise
wireless transmission scheme combining random subcarrier
selection (RSCS), orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
(OFDM), and DM. In such a concept, the beamforming vector
forms a two-dimensional direction and distance dependent
property, which can transmit confidential messages to any
given position, and form a high receive power peak around the
position with only a little energy leaking out to the undesired
area, where the undesired area is composed of all areas outside
a small neighborhood around the desired position.
In [16]–[22], the transmitter transmitted confidential in-
formation concurrently with AN and the optimal power al-
location (OPA) was analysed in different scenarios. Lower
bounds of secrecy rate (SR) in multiple-input single-output
with single-eavesdropper (MISOSE), multiple-input single-
output with multiple-eavesdropper (MISOME) and multiple-
input multiple-output multiple-eavesdropper (MIMOME) were
derived in [16], and the closed-form solutions of OPA were
2obtained from these bounds. Additionally, equal power allo-
cation (PA) and water-filling PA were analysed in this paper.
The authors of [17] investigated the impact of PA parameter
based on the asymptotic achievable SR in MIMO system with
an active eavesdropper when the number of transmit antennas
was infinite. Additionally, the effects of imperfect channel state
information (CSI) were considered in [18], [19]. In [18], the
OPA for the noncolluding eavesdropper case and colluding
eavesdropper case were discussed, respectively. The authors
of [19] proposed the OPA strategy in the presence of spatially
randomly distributed eavesdropper. Furthermore, the authors
designed a correlation-based PA strategy and compared it
with uniform PA and OPA in [20], where the transmitter was
equipped with correlated antennas. A cooperative jamming
scheme was proposed in [21] to enhance the PLS, and the
authors analysed the impact of PA parameter between confi-
dential information and AN by minimizing the secrecy outage
probability subject to a minimum SR constraint. In [22], the
normal transmitter DT is responsible for broadcasting public
information to its service subscriber DR and disrupting the
unauthorized eavesdropper was taken into consideration to
guarantee secure communication.
However, all the above literature concerning PA does not
belong to the scope of DM. To the best of our knowledge,
there is still no research investigation of PA in directional
modulation networks. In this paper, given any beamforming
vector and AN projection at DM transmitter, we propose an
OPA strategy to maximize the SR. Simulation results confirm
the benefit of the OPA. Our main contributions are summarized
as follows:
1) Given the beamforming vector of confidential messages
and AN projection matrix and total power constraint,
a PA strategy of maximizing secrecy rate (Max-SR)
is proposed for secure DM networks. By the method
of Lagrange multiplier, the analytic expression of the
proposed PA strategy is derived.
2) Take the null-space projection (NSP) beamforming
scheme as an example, its simple closed-form expression
is also derived. From simulation results, it follows that
the PA has an obvious dramatic impact on the SR perfor-
mance. Compared with three typical values of PA factor
such as β = 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, especially with small-
scale number of transmit antennas at DM transmitter, the
SR performance gain achieved by the OPA is relatively
attractive with the maximum SR improvement percent
being more than 60%.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the DM system model. In Section III, the PA strat-
egy for Max-SR is proposed and its closed-form expression
is given. Subsequently, the NSP scheme is taken as a special
example and its OPA expression is simplified. Simulation and
numerical results are shown in Section IV. Finally, we draw
our conclusions in Section V.
Notations: Throughout the paper, matrices, vectors, and
scalars are denoted by letters of bold upper case, bold lower
case, and lower case, respectively. Signs (·)T , (·)H , | · | and
‖ · ‖ represent transpose, conjugate transpose, modulus and
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Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the proposed directional modulation system.
norm, respectively. IN denotes the N ×N identity matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The schematic diagram of the proposed DM system is illus-
trated in Fig. 1, where Alice is equipped with N antennas, and
Bob and Eve are equipped with single antenna, respectively.
In this paper, we assume there exists the line-of-sight (LOS)
path. The transmitted baseband signal is expressed as
s =
√
βPsvbx+
√
(1− β)PsPANz, (1)
where Ps is the total transmission power and limited, β and
(1 − β) are the PA parameters of confidential messages and
AN, respectively. vb ∈ CN×1 denotes the transmit beam-
forming vector for controlling the confidential message to the
desired direction and PAN ∈ CN×N is the projection matrix
leading AN to the undesired direction, where vHb vb = 1 and
Tr[PANP
H
AN ] = 1. In (1), x is the confidential message of
satisfying E
{
xHx
}
= 1 and z ∈ CN×1 denotes the AN vector
with complex Gaussian distribution, i.e., z ∼ CN (0, IN ).
Taking the path loss into consideration, the received signal
at Bob can be written as
y(θb) =
√
gabh
H(θb)s + nb
=
√
gabβPsh
H(θb)vbx
+
√
gab(1 − β)PshH(θb)PANz+ nb, (2)
where gab =
α
dc
ab
and h(θb) ∈ CN×1 represent the path
loss coefficient and channel vector between Alice and Bob,
3respectively. dab is the distance between them, c is the path
loss exponent and α is the attenuation at reference distance d0.
nb is the complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with
distribution nb ∼ CN (0, σ2b ). Likewise, the received signal at
Eve is given by
y(θe) =
√
gaeh
H(θe)s+ ne
=
√
gaeβPsh
H(θe)vbx
+
√
gae(1− β)PshH(θe)PANz+ ne, (3)
where gae =
α
dc
ae
, dae and h(θe) ∈ CN×1 denote the path loss
coefficient, the distance and the channel vector between Alice
and Eve, respectively. ne is the complex AWGN following
distribution ne ∼ CN (0, σ2e). In the following, we assume
that σ2b = σ
2
e = σ
2.
As per (2) and (3), we can derive the achievable rate along
Bob and Eve as
R(θb) = log2
(
1 +
gabβPs|hH(θb)vb|2
gab(1− β)Ps‖hH(θb)PAN‖22 + σ2
)
(4)
and
R(θe) = log2
(
1 +
gaeβPs|hH(θe)vb‖2
gae(1 − β)|2Ps‖hH(θe)PAN‖22 + σ2
)
,
(5)
respectively, which yield the following achievable secrecy rate
(SR) Rs
Rs = max {0, R(θb)−R(θe)} . (6)
III. PROPOSED PA STRATEGY OF MAX-SR
In this section, fixing vb and PAN , the PA strategy of
maximizing SR is proposed and its closed-form expression
is presented. The derived expression is a general expression,
which is suitable for any beamforming scheme. For instance,
when the NSP beamforming scheme in [11] is adopted, a
simple formula of OPA is directly given.
A. Proposed General Power Allocation Strategy of Max-SR
Before investigating PA, let us consider the joint optimiza-
tion problem of Max-SR, which is casted as
(P1) : max
vb,PAN ,β
Rs(β) = R(θb)−R(θe)
s. t. 0 6 β 6 1
v
H
b vb = 1
Tr[PANP
H
AN ] = 1. (7)
where the three optimization variables are the PA factor β, vb
and PAN . It is hard to solve the above optimization problem.
In what follows, we focus on the PA problem by assuming that
the beamforming scheme is given. For any fixed beamforming
scheme, it is obvious that PA is an efficient and important way
to enhance its SR. In this subsection, we consider the design of
power allocation factor β based on maximizing the secrecy rate
in general case. If the vb and PAN are known or designed well
in advance, then the above optimization degenerates towards
the following simple PA problem.
(P2) :max
β
Rs(β) = R(θb)−R(θe)
s. t. 0 6 β 6 1
(8)
According to (4) and (5), we can obtain the corresponding
objective function Rs(β) in (8) as
Rs(β) = log2
a(β)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Iβ2 + Jβ +K
Lβ2 +Mβ +K︸ ︷︷ ︸
b(β)
= log2
a(β)
b(β)
= log2 φ(β), (9)
where
I = gabgaeP
2
s ‖hH(θe)PAN‖22
× (‖hH(θb)PAN‖22 − |hH(θb)vb|2) , (10)
J = gabPs
(|hH(θb)vb|2 − ‖hH(θb)PAN‖22)
× (gaePs‖hH(θe)PAN‖22 + σ2)
− gaePs‖hH(θe)PAN‖22
(
gabPs‖hH(θb)PAN‖22 + σ2
)
,
(11)
K =
(
gabPs‖hH(θb)PAN‖22 + σ2
)
× (gaePs‖hH(θe)PAN‖22 + σ2) , (12)
L = gabgaeP
2
s ‖hH(θb)PAN‖22
× (‖hH(θe)PAN‖22 − |hH(θe)vb|2) , (13)
M = gaePs
(|hH(θe)vb|2 − ‖hH(θe)PAN‖22)
× (gabPs‖hH(θb)PAN‖22 + σ2)
− gabPs‖hH(θb)PAN‖22
(
gaePs‖hH(θe)PAN‖22 + σ2
)
.
(14)
Under the total transmit power constraint, the SR given by
(9) is also limited. This means the numerator a(β) and
denominator b(β) of the fraction inside logarithm operation
(9) should be not equal to zero. Otherwise, an infinite value
of SR is generated. Maximizing SR in (9) is equivalent to
∂Rs(β)
∂β
=
1
φ(β)
∂φ(β)
∂β
= 0, (15)
which can be reduced to
∂φ(β)
∂β
=
(IM − JL)β2 + 2K(I − L)β +K(J −M)
(Lβ2 +Mβ +K)2
= 0
(16)
considering φ(β) 6= 0, where φ(β) = 0 means that SR is
infinity. In terms of the above identity, we have the candidates
for the optimal PA factor
β1 =
−K(I − L) +√∆
(IM − JL) (17)
and
β2 =
−K(I − L)−√∆
(IM − JL) , (18)
4where ∆ = K2(I − L)2) −K(IM − JL)(J −M) ≥ 0 due
to the non-negative real PA factor. The condition a(β) = 0
yields two singular points
βa1 =
−J ±√J2 − 4IK
2I
, βa2 =
−J ±√J2 − 4IK
2I
(19)
The condition b(β) = 0 yields the remain two singular points
βa1 =
−J ±√J2 − 4IK
2I
, βa2 =
−J ±√J2 − 4IK
2I
(20)
The above four critical points make the value of SR approach
infinity, which is impossible to achieve an infinite SR with
finite power in practice. For the purpose of simplifying our
analysis below, it is assumed that the above four critical points
lie outside the PA interval [0, 1].
Meanwhile, we need to judge whether the two stationary
points are in the interval of (0, 1). After that, we can obtain
the optimal value of β by comparing the values of φ(β) at
endpoints and corresponding stationary points. While ∆ ≥ 0
cannot be guaranteed, we need to discuss the relation between
0 and (IM − JL). The OPA parameter β∗ can be obtained
by evaluating the following three cases.
Case 1. If IM − JL > 0, φ(β) is a monotonously increasing
function. Therefore, the OPA parameter is β∗ = 1 and the
maximum secrecy rate is R∗s = Rs(1) = log2
I+J+K
L+M+K ,
i.e., all power of Alice is employed to transmit confidential
information and the AN fails to work.
Case 2. When IM − JL = 0, the stationary point is
β3 =
M−J
2(I−L) . If β3 ∈ (0, 1), We need to compare the value of
φ(0), φ(β3) and φ(1) and obtain the OPA parameter β
∗ by the
corresponding value of β of the maximum φ(β). Otherwise,
we just need to compare the values of φ(0) and φ(1).
Case 3. If IM −JL < 0, φ(β) is a monotonously decreasing
function. Consequently, the OPA parameter is β∗ = 0 and the
optimal secrecy rate is R∗s = Rs(0) = 0, i.e., no confidential
messages is transmitted to Bob and the secure communication
cannot be guaranteed.
Furthermore, the detailed operational procedures of the
proposed Max-SR PA strategy are presented in Algorithm 1.
B. Proposed Simple Max-SR PA Strategy for NSP Beamform-
ing Scheme
If the general beamforming scheme in subsection A is
the simplest NSP scheme, then the problem to compute the
optimal PA factor β can be significantly simplified. In the
case of NSP, the normalized values of beamforming vector vb
and projection matrix PAN is given by [11]
vb =
1√
N
h(θb) (21)
and
PAN =
IN − 1Nh(θb)hH(θb)
‖IN − 1N h(θb)hH(θb)‖F
, (22)
respectively, where
h(θb) =
[
ej2piΨθb (1), · · · , ej2piΨθb (n), · · · , ej2piΨθb (N)
]T
(23)
Algorithm 1 Proposed optimal power allocation strategy
1) Initialization: Ps, gab, gae, h(θb), h(θe), SNR.
2) Compute ∆ = K2(I − L)2 −K(IM − JL)(J −M).
a) If ∆ ≥ 0, four different cases are considered as
fowllows
Case 1. If β1 ∈ (0, 1), β2 ∈ (0, 1), then compare
the values of φ(0), φ(β1), φ(β2) and φ(1).
Case 2. If β1 ∈ (0, 1), β2 /∈ (0, 1), then compare
the values of φ(0), φ(β1) and φ(1).
Case 3. If β1 /∈ (0, 1), β2 ∈ (0, 1), then compare
the values of φ(0), φ(β2) and φ(1).
Case 4. If β1 /∈ (0, 1), β2 /∈ (0, 1), then compare
the values of φ(0) and φ(1).
After comparing the values of corresponding φ(β),
we can get the OPA parameter β∗ by the corre-
sponding value of β of the maximum φ(β).
b) If ∆ < 0, the OPA parameter β∗ has been solved
in the aforementioned Case 1 to Case 3.
and the phase function Ψθb(n) is defined as
Ψθb(n) , −
(n− (N + 1)/2)d cos θb
λ
, n = 1, 2, · · ·N, (24)
where n denotes the n-th antenna, d is the distance of two
adjacent antennas, and λ is the wavelength.
Substituting (21) and (22) into (9), the first derivative of
φ(β) can be written as
∂φ(β)
∂β
=
IMβ2 + 2KIβ +K(J −M)
(Mβ +K)2
, (25)
where
I = −NgabgaeP 2s ‖hH(θe)PAN‖22, (26)
J = NgabPs
(
gaePs‖hH(θe)PAN‖22 + σ2
)
− gaePsσ2‖hH(θe)PAN‖22, (27)
K = σ2
(
gaePs‖hH(θe)PAN‖22 + σ2
)
, (28)
M = gaePsσ
2
(|hH(θe)vb|2 − ‖hH(θe)PAN‖22) . (29)
In the case of IM 6= 0, the corresponding roots β1 and β2
corresponding to the equation that (25) is equal to zero can
be denoted as
β1 =
−KI +√K2I2 −KIM(J −M)
IM
(30)
and
β2 =
−KI −√K2I2 −KIM(J −M)
IM
(31)
when K2I2 −KI(J −M) ≥ 0. In the case of IM = 0, the
stationary point β3 can be formulated as
β3 =
M − J
2I
. (32)
Based on the above results, the determinant of OPA parameter
β∗ is detailedly shown in Algorithm 1.
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IV. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
To assess the SR performance gain of the proposed Max-
SR PA strategy, simulation results and analysis are presented
in the following. Taking NSP as beamforming scheme, we
numerically examine the effect of β on the performance gain
achieved by the optimal PA strategy in comparison with some
typical PA strategies.
In our simulation, system parameters are set as follows:
quadrature phase shift keying(QPSK) modulation, the total
transmitting power Ps = 70dBm, the spacing between two
adjacent antennas d = λ/2, the distance between Alice and
Bob is dab = 500m, the distance between Alice and Eve
is dae = 500m, the path loss exponent c = 2, the desired
direction θb = 30
◦, and the eavesdropping direction θe = 45
◦.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate versus β (SNR=30dB).
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Fig. 2 plots the curves of SR (i.e., secrecy rate) versus β
with SNR=0dB. This case corresponds to the low SNR region.
From this figure, we can observe that the SR increases with
increasing the number of antennas. In addition, from the figure,
it is seen that the SR increases continuously with the increase
of β regardless of the number of antennas. The result could
be explained as follows: the superimposed AN is unnecessary
in the low SNR regime because the channel noise is large
enough. When the number of antennas is small, the SR is also
small. For example, the SR approaches zero when the number
of antennas is 4.
Fig. 3 demonstrates the curves of SR versus β with
SNR=15dB. The situation corresponds to the medium SNR
region. We can find that the SR curve is concave downward
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and a concave function of β, i.e., there exists a unique value
of OPA parameter β∗, which may maximize over the interval
[0,1]. Furthermore, the associated optimal value of β are 0.49,
0.88 and 0.99 when the number of antennas is 4, 16 and 64.
It is seen that the optimal value of β grow gradually as the
number of antennas increases from 4 to 64.
Fig. 5, Fig. 6, and Fig. 7 depict the histograms of the SR
versus N at β = 0.1, β = 0.5 and β = 0.9, respectively. From
Fig. 5, we can observe that the SR performance improvements
achieved by the optimal value β over β = 0.1 are 23.3%,
46.5% and 40.9% for N=4, N=16, and N=64, respectively. The
achievable SR performance gain is very attractive. Increasing
the value of β up to 0.5 even 0.9, the SR performance gain
indicates an obvious reduction trend as shown in Fig. 6, and
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Fig. 8. Theoretical optimal power allocation parameter β∗ versus SNR with
different numbers of antennas.
Fig. 7. However, there are still a substantial performance gain
in a small-scale number of transmit antennas.
Furthermore, the SR performance gain percentage compared
with the SR of OPA parameter is shown in the three bar
diagrams. The performance gain percentage achieved by OPA
parameter at SNR=30dB is remarkable, especially when the
PA factor β = 0.1.
In Fig. 8, we plot the theoretical optimal power allocation
parameter β∗ versus SNR with different numbers of antennas.
Observing this figure, we can find that the theoretical OPA
parameter β∗ maintain 1 in the low SNR regime and begin
to decrease in the medium and high SNR regimes, which
represents that the AN has a little effect on SR performance
in the low SNR regime and the impact of AN becomes
larger in the medium and high SNR regimes. Additionally, the
theoretical OPA parameter β∗ declines earlier and faster for
a small number of antennas, for example, N = 4, compared
with a larger number of antennas such as N = 16 or 64. This
demonstrates that the power to transmit confidential messages
using a small number of antennas is less than that using a
large number of antennas.
V. CONCLUSION
In our work, we proposed an optimum PA strategy of
maximizing SR in secure DM networks. Firstly, a general op-
timization problem of maximizing SR was established. Given
any beamforming scheme, the closed-form OPA strategy is
given. Then the OPA parameter can be obtained by discussing
different scenarios. Finally, the NSP-based OPA strategy is
taken into consideration and its closed-form formula was de-
rived. Simulation and numerical results show that, in medium
and high SNR regions, the proposed OPA can substantially
improve the SR performance compared with some typical PA
factors such as 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9. Moreover, the OPA factor
achieves its optimal value in the open interval (0, 1), and
7grows gradually with increasing in the number of transmit
antennas. In the low SNR region, the OPA factor β is equal
to 1, i.e., the total transmit power is utilized to transmit
confidential messages and the AN play a trivial role here.
As the number of antennas tends to large-scale, the OPA
parameter is close to one. In summary, in the medium and
high SNR regions or small number of transmit antennas at
DM transmitter, the OPA strategy has an important impact on
SR performance. The proposed OPA strategy is a general-form
PA strategy suitable for any beamforming scheme, and may be
applied to any given bemaforming scheme. This makes it avail-
able to the diverse future applications such as future mobile
communications, satellite communications, millimeter-wave
communications, unmanned-aerial-vehicles networks, device-
to-device, and vehicle-to-vehicle.
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